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A NARRATION IS NOT AN EQUATION: 
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPALS OF STANDARD COSMOLOGY 
 
 We live in a world where science is considered to be the only valid form of 
knowledge; furthermore, it is taken for granted that such a thing called science 
actually exists. Science can be characterized by having a method that defines it and 
establishes the limits between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge 
that do not posses this universal validity -- which is the most specific characteristic of 
scientific knowledge. This science, characterized by the mastering of a method (a 
method which, interestingly enough, philosophers of science are ever less capable of 
defining), possesses yet another defining characteristic: unitary knowledge. The 
unity of science, an old aspiration of the Vienna Circle, can be defined by two 
assumptions. The first of these would be of a logical nature, and can be formulated 
in the following manner: 
 1) There is a body of knowledge that can be denominated by the noun 
science. If these types of knowledge form part of a set, they must posses at least 
one attribute in common. This attribute can be either: (a) Formal, where all 
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knowledge is configured in the same form or by the same method; or (b) Material, 
where all knowledge is part of a common subject, and that subject is the universe, or 
field, to which that knowledge refers. 
 We can categorize the second assumption in the following manner because it 
is shared -- without being clearly formulated -- by all scientists: 
 2) Science is an ordered conjunct, within which its members are not only 
perfectly ordered, but also hierarchized in such a way that science can account for 
the totality of the universe because it is capable of developing explanations in a 
hierarchical manner, beginning with the most simple and ending with the most 
complex. 
 This hierarchy of scientific knowledge -- which incorporates harmoniously 
what was known as the Great chain of being within the Aristotelian and Scholastic 
traditions and covered everything from unformed and inert matter to God -- is now 
presented to a public composed of those of us who are not scientists as well as 
those who are. Among the latter are some who aspire to offer a global synthesis of 
scientific knowledge in the format of a big history, or a big narration, which begins at 
the supposed moment of the origin of the cosmos and ends at the present time, thus 
giving an account of the reason of being of the universe as well as of humankind. 
 This historicization of the universe, which would permit the integration of all 
knowledge, from topology and geometry to sociology and history, passing through 
physics, astronomy, chemistry and biology, is becoming more and more accepted as 
a perfectly coherent system of knowledge, and, like all kinds of overly coherent 
knowledge, attempts to usurp reality. These types of systematizations are currently 
offered in various sorts of books, some written by popularizers, others written by 
eminent scientists who proceed from fields such as physics, chemistry, biology, or 
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even history or sociology. All these books start off from a common scheme, narrating 
a “big history” from the Big Bang until today, as Fred Spier’s title indicates, a book 
that we can consider a Vulgate within these types of narrative creations.1 
 If we wish to search for the origins of these big histories we can resort to two 
types of sources, which interestingly enough converge in a common root. On the one 
hand, we find books written by historians who not long ago understood that human 
history cannot be dissociated from the history of the Earth, and also that this planet 
is no more than a miniscule part of the cosmos. Such is the case of H. G. Wells, who 
wrote the first book which focused on human history within the framework of an 
ecologic context, attempting to find large global tendencies; this book has been 
enlarged and republished numerous times.2 Another such author is William H. 
McNeill, who carried out a similar endeavor, although not from the perspective of a 
novelist who was fond of history, as was the case with H. G. Wells, but from the 
perspective of a professional historian.3 
Wells and McNeill completed their work long before the arrival of the term 
“standard cosmology.” By integrating relativity with quantum mechanics, this 
cosmology would later be considered definitive. Once this type of cosmology was 
systemized, other historians such as David Christian went on to integrate these two 
narrative structures believing that they were achieving the integration of cosmology 
and history, which is really nothing more than what was previously known as natural 
science or science of culture or history.4 
 What we will attempt to accomplish hereafter is an analysis of the 
assumptions shared by all the authors of these types of accounts that -- following 
Fred Spier’s example -- we shall call “big history.” These assumptions are strictly of a 
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metaphysical nature and therefore tell us more about the writers than about the 
contents of the narratives. 
Our work can be placed along the same line of thought initiated by John 
Dupré, starting out from the principle according to which the idea that the universe is 
something ordered does not refer to the universe itself; instead, it refers to an 
anthropological assumption that is indispensable for defending the idea of the unity 
of knowledge -- which was once theological and philosophical -- and of the unity of 
science. Dupré prefers to talk about the “disorder of things,” a slogan that we should 
only accept rhetorically because, in reality, neither order nor disorder are attributes of 
the universe itself. If Dupré coined this expression for the title of his book, he did it to 
a certain extent to explain he was against supposedly global explanations of the 
universe, which posses a series of common characteristics, both within those models 
named deterministic as well as within other models named probabilistic.5 
It is well known that the person who most clearly symbolizes the determinist 
ideal in cosmology is Pierre Simon Laplace. In the early nineteenth century, with his 
“system of the world,” Laplace attempted to give credibility to the idea that the 
universe is perfectly ordered and coherent, and that if we were to understand all the 
elements that composed it, we would be able to regress to each and every past 
moment and also predict the future. The universe would thus be the gigantic 
mechanical clock the European Enlightenment was fond of imagining. However, 
upon reading Laplace we find that his determinism limits itself to the solar system, 
and that it conceals numerous problems. There are facts like Mercury’s perihelion 
that cannot be explained; furthermore, Laplace’s mathematical model becomes 
useless when more than two planets enter into the calculations, thus raising the 
problem of the “three bodies.” Nevertheless, Laplace maintained his determinist and 
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cosmologic faith, which is basically shared by present day cosmologists, biologists, 
and historians. We are not going to attempt to explain the problems of the “three 
bodies” of the current cosmologies, but simply shed light on the obscure points 
where lack of evidence is covered by the appeal to a series of metaphysical 
principles, of which scientists and historians are not totally cognizant.6 
All contemporary cosmology is based on what is known as the Anthropic 
Principle, according to which it should be possible to explain how humans have 
come into being and are able to exist in relative stability within the framework of the 
universe. The anthropic principle is nothing more than a reformulation of the old 
Scholastic principle, which later became a Rationalist principle known as the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, recently analyzed and reassessed by Alexander R. 
Pruss.7 According to this principle: nihil est sine ratione, in other words, we can 
account for everything that exists. As Arthur Schopenhauer mentioned in his doctoral 
dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, this principle 
can be confused with the principle of causality, passionately defended by all the 
champions of unified science and of the rationality of the universe, as is the case of 
one of the best known, the Argentine-Canadian philosopher Mario Bunge.8 
In the analysis we will attempt to develop, we start off from precisely the 
opposite premise: omnis est sine ratione, that is, the reason of things does not reside 
within the disorder of things themselves, but within the language. Reason and order 
are not attributes of the universe, but of thought, and the only way to be coherent, if 
we want to defend the anthropic principle and the principle of sufficient reason, is to 
assume that God exists and is a thinking being who created the universe passing 
onto it His best attribute: the attribute of rationality. 
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In our analysis, which can be labeled a “reassertion of contingency,” we start 
off from an epistemological principle established by the physicist Pierre Duhem in 
1914, and reassessed recently by Nicolas Rescher, which states that the amplitude 
and the extension of a scientific theory are inversely proportional.9 According to this 
principle, a theory of everything, a final theory, like those that many physicists are 
fond of -- including Stephen Hawking and certain “superstring” theorists such as 
Brian Greene -- are characterized for being wholly inaccurate.10 
We shall attempt to describe the obscure points of “standard cosmology” by 
following its own narrative thread. Standard cosmology is a narration, constructed on 
the basis of various types of scientific knowledge. As is the case with all narrations, 
we can distinguish the following parts: (1) Every narration takes place on a stage -- 
in this case the stage is the universe. (2) Every narration has a protagonist -- in this 
case the protagonist is not the universe, it is humankind. (3) The protagonist needs 
time to develop an action -- here time is identified with history itself, which Hawking 
actually calls “history of time,” but time is not the protagonist of the story, simply a 
condition for the story to occur. (4) The protagonist develops his or her action with 
the aid of certain means -- in this case those means are the different structures of 
matter, which follow the road of ontological hierarchy. (5) Every narration concludes 
with an end -- in this case the end is the present time, although some narrators such 
as Stephen Hawking and Paul Davies are fond of constructing models of the 
destruction of the universe, or they attempt to revive the myth of the eternal return 
with universes in constant expansion and contraction.11 Some even imagine bizarre 
contradictions in terms such as “multiverses,” which are the totalities that compose 
the whole -- something which cannot be, and, what's more, is impossible, as a 
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famous bullfighter once said, a statement with which David Deutsch would not 
agree.12 
In our narration we shall follow a number of different writers who sum up the 
“standard cosmology,” authors such as Steven Weinberg, Harry L. Shipman, Roger 
Penrose, Robert Geroch, Michael Disney, Harald Fritzsch, and even Stephen 
Hawking himself.13 The fact that the authors have omitted the mathematical 
apparatus in these books, and the fact that neither I nor many other readers would 
be able to understand the mathematics had it been included, does not interfere with 
our ability to understand the theory, for two different reasons. First of all, because the 
authors themselves state that they can explain the essential aspects without 
resorting to mathematics, and secondly because we are interested in the 
metaphysical assumptions and these cannot be mathematically formulated. If they 
could be, they would not be metaphysical. And if the essential aspects of the theory 
could not be explained in ordinary language, then it would fall within the field of the 
ineffable and form part of those experiences that cannot be shared linguistically. 
To understand this story we must begin with the modest observation made by 
astronomer Edwin Hubble many years ago. Hubble, who was not a theorist but 
basically an observer, reported that the spectrum of light of all the galaxies 
observable from the earth was shifting toward red, which is to say that the band of 
the spectrum corresponding to red was becoming wider. As it is a well known fact 
that a “redshift” occurs when a light-emitting object moves away from an observer, 
Hubble concluded that all the galaxies where moving away from us. If they were 
moving away, this meant that they were separating, and if they were separating, it 
meant that at one time they had been closer, thus the universe had to be expanding. 
Our reference books explain -- so that we can understand the concept -- that the 
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universe is like a sponge cake with raisins which has been placed in an oven, and as 
it begins to increase in size, the raisins, which would be our galaxies, move away 
from one another. 
If we go back in time clustering galaxies, we must arrive at a point when all of 
them were together. We can formulate the “primeval scene” of our cosmic history by 
starting off from this idea and uniting the theory of relativity with the theory of 
quantum mechanics. Einstein established that the universe could be understood as 
an enormous field of forces, in which the fundamental ones were -- at his time at 
least -- gravity and electromagnetism. The universe would thus be a structure formed 
by space and time, and the configuration of that space-time would have been the 
result of the density of matter. If we construct a mathematical model basing 
ourselves on this theory and on Hubble’s observation, we can conclude the 
following: According with the field equations of the so-called general relativity, a 
situation might arise in which space-time could collapse, with space disappearing in 
a point without dimensions. 
 Within these field equations the so-called singularities are produced, which 
are cases when these equations, so to speak, collapse. Within the singularities of 
relativity, space loses its volume; consequently, matter, which continues to exist, 
reaches an infinite density because density is equal to matter divided by volume. 
These singularities, predicted by Einstein, are now called black holes -- physical 
phenomena that, for our narrators, are as prestigious as they are exotic. The initial 
phase of the universe can, therefore, be considered an enormous black hole which 
expanded until reaching the present state. The fact that Einstein predicted the 
existence of black holes constitutes a great part of their prestige.14 What Einstein 
could not foresee, however, was that all this could be integrated with quantum 
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mechanics, which he always disliked for aesthetic reasons because it disrupted his 
idea of a harmonious universe.15 
Thanks to the development of quantum chromodynamics (the physical-
mathematical theory of quarks) and later the development of the theory of 
superstrings, quantum mechanics was able to integrate the relativist model of the 
universe with the history of elemental particles in the following manner: A 
concentrated universe of almost infinite density is a very hot universe in which matter 
is under great pressure. Under those conditions of temperature and pressure only 
certain types of particles can exist. Quarks had their origin in the superstrings which, 
of course, are hypothetical, since, by definition, they cannot be observed -- as is the 
case of the quarks, which are “confined” within particles. Through the combination of 
quarks: Top, Bottom, Up, Down, Strange and Charm, heavy particles called baryons 
would have been formed, and thus, as the universe continued to cool and expand, 
what is possibly the most important event in the history of the cosmos took place, the 
appearance of hydrogen -- the first type of atom. 
The combustion of hydrogen and its transformation into helium, according to 
the equation: E=mc2, which results from the contraction of the gas due to 
gravitational force, would have produced the stars and the galaxies, which continued 
to form part of the simultaneous processes of expansion and cooling down. From the 
cooling down of the fragments of a star -- which in our case would be the sun -- the 
planets would have been formed, including the Earth. After the cooling down process 
had brought about new elements of the periodic system in the Earth, the first 
molecules appeared and these would have made life possible. Life had its own 
dynamics, culminating in the arrival of humans. The engraving on the final page, 
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taken from Harald Fritzsch’s Quarks: The Stuff of Matter, provides a straight-forward 
display of this narrative scheme. 
We will finish narrating the story before pointing out its problems. Within the 
world of chemistry, the distinction between organic and inorganic compounds was 
regarded almost as a dogma. This dogma was demolished with the synthesis of 
urea. The jump from inorganic to organic was only a first step. Starting out with 
organic compounds, scientists later discovered the large molecules -- studied by 
biochemistry -- which make up all living beings. 
It is not known how or where the synthesis of molecules that can copy each 
other, or duplicate themselves, first took place. These molecules are the genes; they 
synthesize proteins, and living beings are constituted from them. Genes are 
composed of four bases (adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine), which can 
recombine in almost infinite ways, thus accounting for the diversity of life forms. 
Genes are formed basically from two types of molecules: RNA and DNA, with DNA 
being fundamental for the development of life as we know it. 
It is not easy to explain the origin of life. According to Fred Hoyle and N. C. 
Wickramasinghe, the physical conditions for such synthesis could only have 
occurred outside the Earth, with the necessary molecules arriving on a meteorite.16 
Other authors, including Paul Davis, Jesús Mosterín, and Roger Penrose, do not 
fully accept the contingent act of the arrival of one or more meteorites.17 
Nevertheless, the one thing all of them agree upon is that the advent of life had to be 
a contingent event, just as all species of life are contingent, merely developing some 
of the possibilities of an almost infinite number of genetic programs. 
Continuing with our story we can find that the history of life went from 
unicellular to pluricellular organisms, and from asexual to sexual reproduction, in 
  
11 
progressively increasing complexity culminating with human beings as the superior 
life form. Here we would have to accept the fact that standard cosmology is 
manifested by the theory of evolution, a theory which is more or less plausible; 
however, due to religious or ideological reasons it is often cited not as a theory, but 
as a fact. Stephen Jay Gould has done an extensive study of its history and 
structure.18 Basing ourselves on his work, and on the work of Ernst Mayr, we will 
now put forward some of the problems presented by this theory, showing the 
weakness of the principle of sufficient reason, as opposed to the power of 
contingency.19 
Mayr points out that within biology there are three paradigms -- scientific 
systems -- that function in parallel and are sometimes difficult to merge together. 
There is a descriptive biology whose mission is to catalogue the millions of life forms, 
the exact number of which is unknown, although it is estimated to be approximately 
three million at present. This system is based on morphology, and some surprisingly 
simple and beautiful results can be obtained -- such as those of Sir D’Arcy 
Wentworth Thompson -- observing the underlying geometric proportions of many life 
forms, which seem to follow mathematical laws; nevertheless, morphology is the 
realm of plurality, contingency, and continuous variation.20 
Morphology and genetics are most probably related, but it is impossible to 
integrate them at present, and perhaps always will be, due to the impossibility of 
explaining billions of possible forms and combinations. The morphologic and genetic 
debate needs to be linked to the evolutional one in the same manner, but it is not so 
simple to make them coincide. Gould has pointed out that Darwin established the 
almost uselessness of the fossil registry for verification of his theory. According to 
Darwin, this was due to the fact that the transmission of fossils is arbitrary and 
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dependent on totally contingent geologic and chemical circumstances; thus, fossils 
could neither refute nor endorse a theory that was essentially built upon suppositions 
arrived at from morphologic observations. 
Gould points out this contradiction between genetic and evolutionary logic. As 
opposed to the geneticists who are fond of speaking of selfish genes and genetic 
logic as the key to evolutionary dynamics, this author upholds the old notion of the 
organism. The organism possesses a structure and logic that in many cases 
subordinates the genes. Evolution would then be the evolution of organisms and 
species, and not primarily of the genes. The organism belongs to the realm of 
morphology, and morphology to the realm of contingent variety; thus, in this case as 
well, the omnipotence of the “reason of history” would diminish -- to use a Hegelian 
term. 
Gould, furthermore, proposes a much more contingent model of evolution as 
opposed to a determinist model marked by necessity. He is the author of a theory 
called “punctuated equilibrium,” according to which, organisms which adapt 
themselves perfectly to their environment become fragile and are not able to respond 
to catastrophic contingencies. When these occur, the less adapted, or marginalized, 
organisms are the ones who survive, adapting themselves to the new environment 
until the time when they are displaced by other marginalized organisms. This would 
have been the case of the extinction of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago and the 
success of our mammal ancestors. 
As opposed to a rather dogmatic evolutionism, which, long before Darwin 
published his Origin of Species, was already a reflection of numerous ideas of 
Victorian political economics endorsing the survival of the fittest,21 Gould emphasizes 
a non-providential evolutionism, not based on the principle of sufficient reason, but 
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conceived much more contingently within the scope of classical historiography, or 
within that of European historicism. 
The problems of biological knowledge are much more complex than those of 
physical and chemical knowledge. There are open questions, such as the interaction 
between organic and inorganic substances, which seem to form part of the same 
system and make the theory of evolution and the concept of biology itself much more 
complex. James Lovelock has raised some of these questions. His observations, 
leaving aside the exaggerations, seem to hold much truth in them.22 
If we move on from the field of evolution to that of human history, the matter 
becomes even more complex, because we would be required to touch upon the 
fields of philosophy and theory of history, which are not now our objective. 
Nowadays, it seems quite clear that the former idea of progress might have its lights 
and shadows, and the belief that we are at the highest phase of historical 
development -- just because it is the latest -- does not make much sense, precisely 
because the integration of human history within the ecologic field does not stop the 
exposure of the fragility of our supposedly rational and apparently secure world. 
Having provided a broad outline of our cosmologic history, we shall now 
attempt to clarify the manner in which culture talks through science, as Pierre 
Thuillier stated, and in this case we could refer to an implicit lack of philosophical 
culture.23 Let us return philosophically to the beginnings. Standard cosmology is 
presented to us as a very coherent narration in which a succession of perfectly 
ordered events takes place across a long time span, from the beginnings of the 
universe until the present. Within this succession of events we ascend on a scale 
where the simple evolves into the complex, following steps very similar to those of 
the old chain of being.  
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This succession of events is presented as the result of multiple scientific 
investigations, which converge among each other, to the point where we are told that 
we are faced with theories of everything that explain all kinds of facts, from quantum 
data to the human mind, as occurs in the book by Roger Penrose.24 The matter, 
however, is a bit more complex, since these theories are only capable of explaining a 
small part of this long chain of events. Furthermore, the various scientific theories -- 
which apparently form part of a whole -- not only do not converge, but in many cases 
are incompatible to each other, as with the three simultaneous paradigms of biology 
previously mentioned. 
Standard cosmology is a narration constructed on the basis of a series of 
scientific theories that attempt to group together facts and events of a very diverse 
nature. One cannot affirm that the narration is true for being based on scientific 
knowledge. No narration is true or false, only more or less credible, its credibility 
depending on the cultural or religious values of its age, and the knowledge the 
narration is capable of integrating within those cultural value systems. 
The structure of standard cosmology is fully narrative, since it fulfills all the 
characteristics of a story we have enumerated earlier. In other words, it consists of 
an action, a stage, one or various agents, and the means necessary to achieve an 
end. The ending of our cosmologic narrative is the present time. This type of finale, 
contrary to what occurs in other providential stories, does not assert that we have 
arrived at the closing of history from where we can no longer advance, as was the 
case, for example, with nineteenth-century evolutionism. 
We now possess enough ecologic and cosmologic knowledge to know that 
humankind is not necessarily the heir of the universe. On the contrary, our species 
seems to be terribly fragile and could face extinct
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catastrophes, as occurred with the dinosaurs due to the impact of a meteorite. It is 
even possible to calculate the characteristics of a meteorite that could bring about 
our extinction.25 Such successive extinctions are precisely the key, as we have seen, 
of Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium. 
Although it is true that on an ontological level we no longer share the faith in 
the perfection of the cosmos that would constitute the guarantee of our survival, that 
faith is maintained on the epistemological level. In other words, we believe that 
although we don’t know everything (since science must progress for scientific work 
to make sense), we do know the essentials. Our bodies might very well be settled 
upon an unstable physical world, but our minds, on the contrary, advance through 
what Kant called “the sure path of science,” a path from which we must not digress 
because it is capable of offering us sufficient explanations, presupposed by the 
anthropic principle, and by our old metaphysical principle of sufficient reason. 
For the purpose of demonstrating that our standard cosmology is a narration, 
it would be interesting -- as with any other narration -- to clarify two flaws which it is 
based on, and which are usually hidden. These weaknesses may be of a linguistic or 
factual character. We will analyze both simultaneously. 
Our cosmologists appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), and here 
they come up against numerous problems. In the first place, they establish an initial 
stage for their story. That initial stage cannot be observed for two reasons; first, 
because it would have taken place some 15,000 million years ago; second, because 
obviously there could not have been any observers present. 
If there is one thing we can be sure of ever since Einstein, it is that there is no 
absolute space or time, and that all physical observation depends on the reference 
system of the observer in the space-time continuum. This affirmation presupposes 
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that all observations are contingent. If, furthermore, we consider that according to an 
old principle of quantum mechanics the observer modifies the object observed due to 
the interference of his observational devices -- which really means these devices 
construct the object -- we would, therefore, have to conclude that the Big Bang 
cannot be considered in any way whatsoever to be more than mere plausible fiction, 
and, moreover, a narrative type of fiction, and not scientific as it is presented to us. 
The Big Bang -- the original event -- cannot be considered an event for 
reasons that even cosmologists point out. We are aware of only a small part of the 
matter that makes up the universe, and it seems that this matter is often confused 
with mass. It is said that a large part of the universe is made up of dark matter.26 
That matter cannot be observed because it does not produce light, or any type of 
radiation; waves -- of whatever type they may be -- are the only means by which 
information regarding the universe can be transmitted. If a large part of the universe 
is composed of unknown matter, we can say that the probability of the truth of the 
theory of standard cosmology would be equivalent to the ratio between known matter 
and dark matter: P(V) C.= known matter / dark matter. If this matter is supposed to 
make up the major part of our universe, then the probability of the truth of the theory 
of standard cosmology would be so low that no statistician would accept it as such 
(if, for example, it was less than 25%).  
There are other problems as well. Cosmologists say there are four 
fundamental forces in the universe: gravitational, electromagnetic, strong interaction 
and weak interaction. All those forces are transmitted by particles, and it is possible 
to unite those forces to one another mathematically. The first accomplishment was 
the integration of gravity and electromagnetism. Three of those forces have been 
integrated, but it has not yet been possible to integrate all four, which is what the 
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theory of the superstrings seeks to do. Even if they were to be integrated 
mathematically, however, the result would not necessarily be considered an 
undisputable fact. The particles that transmit gravity -- gravitones -- are a theoretical 
assumption, but they are practically unobservable. The same occurs with the results 
of the theory of the superstrings. If quarks are not observable, but only hypothetically 
deduced from mathematical models that attempt to explain certain experimental 
results, superstrings -- by definition -- are totally unobservable. There can be no 
observer nor can there be a spatial-temporal reference system, nor is it possible to 
construct an accelerator to test the viability of the theory; Brian Greene has stated 
that such an experiment would require an accelerator the size of the Milky Way.27 
This, besides being a technological witticism -- where would we get the material? -- 
is also an epistemological witticism -- where would the observer be situated? Let no 
one tell us that this is just an example, and that if we understood the complex 
mathematics of the superstrings we would be able to understand this metaphor ad 
usum delphini (to be understood even by children), because this statement has more 
serious consequences.  
It is clear that the Big Bang cannot be considered a physical event, even 
though it is said to be observable because radiotelescopes can capture the 
“background radiation” that supposedly took place at the beginning of the universe. 
That is mere conjecture, not a fact. The characteristics of that radiation depend on 
the physical-mathematical predictions of a theory that only takes into account a 
minimal part of the possibilities. How can we be sure of the characteristics of the 
“background radiation” if we cannot observe the dark matter? Why do we say we 
know all types of radiation, when we only know a few, especially when we admit the 
possibility of the existence of matter that does not emit radiation. The difficulties 
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posed by the facts are overcome by the apparent mathematical coherence and 
beauty of the theories involved. It is as if our cosmologists were to say that their 
theories are so beautiful that it is not worth risking a hard meeting with reality, which 
they themselves present. To understand this fact, which in no way should be 
attributed to lack of intelligence, nor to ill will on the part of our cosmologists, we 
should analyze their idea of mathematics. 
Physicists say that they explain their theories linguistically because we -- the 
lay public -- would be unable to understand mathematical explanations. And that is 
certainly true. Hence, we, the lay public, can put forth the following question: Can 
ordinary language express in some way the contents of mathematics? If the 
mathematical contents are not merely formal (as in the case of standard cosmology), 
is there a place somewhere between mathematical language and ordinary language 
that can shelter cosmologic ideas? 
We believe so, for the following reasons: Equations are the basic language of 
mathematics. These are structured on the basic concept of equality (=) and make a 
relationship among a series of dependent or independent variables. Those variables 
correspond to concepts: mass, energy, spin..., which must be unequivocally defined. 
In this case, those concepts, besides being formal constructs -- as is the case of 
algebraic concepts -- are assumed to refer to one or more facts. There could even 
be a case where a fact might be explained on the basis of various variables (as, for 
example, in an elementary equation: F=m.a.). 
Mathematical syntax is perfectly constructed, thus it is said that science is a 
well-made language. In this language each mathematical proposition says exactly 
what it says, and there can be no room for metaphors or analogies -- two basic 
instruments of ordinary language. In the case of our cosmologists, however, we find 
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that they jump over the limits of mathematical language, hiding facts that may 
contradict their stories, and bringing forth other facts that are most convenient. They 
do this with the purpose of constructing a narration in ordinary language, a narration, 
however, that they want to put forth as a very complex formal mathematical system, 
which would furthermore be substantiated by an enormous mass of data of all kinds: 
astronomic, physical, chemical, biologic,... Let’s give a simple example. The cosmos 
and the universe are not scientific facts or mathematical concepts. There are no 
equations of the universe or theories of everything. The field equations of general 
relativity are mathematical constructs that draw up a structure of space-time in which 
it is assumed that the four known forces of physics will someday be integrated. The 
universe is not the same thing as the field equations. 
The universe is the collection of everything that exists, or the collection of 
every kind of phenomena. The universe cannot be mathematically formalized, or 
turned into a fact or a field. This is so, especially if we take two things into account: 
first, the theory does not explain all known or possible facts; second, that same 
theory depends on the degree of development achieved by the different 
mathematical sciences, which must be considered provisional, and not definitive, 
unless we truly assume the SAP -- the strong anthropic principle. 
An equation is a fundamental instrument, but not a fact. It is an instrument that 
lets physicists place a fact within a system and make sense of it. By means of an 
equation we can predict an event such as an eclipse. 28 This capacity amazed 
seventeenth-century Europeans and helped create the myth of the determinist and 
perfectly rational universe Laplace believed in. Yet physicists themselves confess 
that such a universe was nothing more than mere fiction created by the faith of the 
scientists of the Enlightenment. Physicists say that we live in a non-determinist 
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world, in which the laws of statistics must replace the ancient laws of mechanics. 
Nevertheless, what is proposed on many levels is later forgotten when speaking of 
the history of the universe, offering a story supposedly substantiated by the great 
weight and authority of science, and endorsed by the solidity of mathematics and a 
large amount of empirical evidence. 
While it is true that the universe is not a variable that can be included in an 
equation, or something that can be explained by a set number of equations, it is also 
true that our cosmologists base themselves on a series of assumptions that are 
mere metaphysics, offering them as the result of extremely complex scientific 
investigations. We previously explained that a singularity within a field equation is a 
mathematical fact according to which the equation would be of no more use, or to 
put it in lay terms, would collapse. A singularity is not a fact, even if the singularities 
of the field equations can be made to coalesce with black holes. A singularity is a 
frontier that establishes the limits where certain mathematical propositions are valid. 
Standard cosmology’s great singularity is the Big Bang, offered to us as a fact; 
however, it cannot be considered an observable event. The Big Bang is the limit 
between the language of mathematics and the language of cosmology. We are not 
saying that the Big Bang can be considered either as proof of the existence of God, 
nor as proof of the creation of the universe. Even such prominent physicists as 
Hawking have reiterated this. What we are saying is that the Big Bang is not a 
cosmological limit, it is an epistemological limit. The Big Bang is the limit of scientific 
languages. It is the collapse of these languages that now cannot continue to speak. 
There is nothing before or after the Big Bang, either tactically or conceptually. 
Nothing can be said about Big Bang scientifically, which would be the only way to 
speak about it, nor is there any other way of making any statements. That which can 
  
21 
be said about all phenomena can only be said scientifically, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
pointed out. The problem here is that what we are interested in talking about cannot 
be talked about. Wittgenstein called this the ineffable, because he maintained a 
private battle against philosophy and metaphysics. 
We want to reassert the role of metaphysics as a way of speaking about these 
ideas, such as the idea of the universe. This is the reason why we are carrying out 
this analysis, where it will be necessary to continue observing the metaphysical 
assumptions of those who maintain there are no assumptions. 
Standard cosmology not only confuses the field equations with the universe, 
but also presents as unquestionable the idea that all complex things may be reduced 
to simplicity. It is a dogma of physics that simple explanations are superior to 
complex ones. The Copernican system was better that the Ptolemaic system 
precisely because it was simpler. Physicists appreciate the value of simplicity, 
elegance, and harmony. Einstein said that he had always been convinced of the 
value of his theory -- even if it could not be proven -- because it was the most 
beautiful.29 That is the reason why he did not like quantum mechanics and said that 
God did not play dice. Einstein’s aesthetic ideals regarding physics turned out to be 
harmful to the development of the investigation, and cosmologists now criticize what 
they call the “great error” that undermined his investigations during the latter part of 
his life.30 
 Nevertheless, the aesthetic ideas regarding the value of simplicity and also 
the search for harmony continue to be present within standard cosmology. First of 
all, because it is the universe itself that becomes harmonious, not because it 
constitutes a perfectly stable system -- and this is recognized -- but because the 
“system of science” can account for the totality of the universe. At one time, human 
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beings could feel secure in the universe because there were gods who guaranteed 
its order. Later, the laws of mechanics constituted the guarantee of our security. 
Now, it is science, understood as an anonymous and enormously complex system 
where the combination of technology and investigation, and the integration of 
technique, experimentation, and formal developments (mathematics and information 
systems) offer us a world governed by the definite system of truth, which would be 
the guarantee of all certainty and also of our happiness.31  
The problem is that complexity takes revenge on simplicity, and experimental 
facts continually overwhelm the framework of theories and actual formal structures, 
which also end up collapsing. If the mere physical universe poses the problems 
mentioned earlier, the matter becomes more complex if we then bring up the old 
problem of the ontological spheres, which can now be reformulated as the problem 
of the limits of scientific languages. 
 If chemistry and physics exist, it is because chemical phenomena cannot be 
reduced to the physical sphere, even though there is a science called chemical 
physics (also known as “theoretical chemistry”) which continues seeking this 
convergence, a convergence that is impossible because it seems likely that we will 
never be able to confine the almost infinite diversity of chemical facts and 
compounds within the same mold. If that ever occurred, it would be the end of 
chemistry and physics as we know them, and the beginning of another science -- or 
various other sciences -- that we cannot even begin to imagine. The language of 
chemistry starts where the language of physics stops, and if one cannot be reduced 
to the other, it means that the harmonious construct we call science presents us with 
numerous problems in its definition, a definition that is impossible to establish 
according to the assertions of certain “philosophers of science.” 
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If we continue ascending the chain of being and move on from chemistry to 
biology, we would find ourselves in the exact same situation. The vital phenomena 
are not possible without a chemical and physical base -- life can only develop within 
a narrow margin of temperatures. Biology, however, cannot just be reduced to the 
language of chemistry, although biochemistry -- and genetics above it -- may try, of 
course, to do so. Chemical physics, biochemistry, and genetics are necessary 
endeavors and mean embarking upon a quest that is unattainable by definition. This 
does not, however, diminish its value. Karl Popper stated that science was an 
“unended quest” and that it was often more important to search for the truth than to 
find it. Popper was a philosopher with a scientific education. Modern scientists, on 
the contrary, have no philosophical education. This is the reason why they often 
confuse what they know with the actual matter in question, which, according to 
Popper and against Wittgenstein’s opinion, constitutes the object of philosophy.  
We can continue moving up the ontological chain and go from biology to 
psychology, or to social and historical phenomena, but we would have to repeat what 
we have said previously. Above the genes are the organisms, as Gould used to say. 
The human organism is very complex. Despite advances in neurosciences, not all 
psychological facts can be reduced to chemical phenomena. The explanation of 
neurotransmitters can partially explain some illnesses, without, to tell the truth, much 
success, since, for example, only 50% of depressions are cured with 
antidepressants, the same percentage as those cured with psychotherapy.32 For this 
argument to be complete, however, it would have to explain not only “pathological” 
phenomena, but also “normal” ones. It would have to explain, for example, the 
neuroscience of marriage, patriotism, or even the minds and creativity of scientists.  
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I believe there would be no sense in reducing sociological and historical 
phenomena to mere ecologic levels, and consequently biological or physical 
chemical, despite efforts such as those of David Christian.33 Without denying the 
value of these efforts, it seems clear from Christian’s book that his “Big History” is 
simply a type of narration, an ecologic narration that leaves out the greater part of 
the dimensions of history itself, precisely because they cannot be reduced to the 
language of ecology.  
The need for a reduction to simpler ontological or epistemological levels may 
be an acceptable desideratum, but runs the risk of becoming a sort of program of 
epistemological or political domination, which serves to defend the omniscience and 
omnipotence of what is known as science, and which, being linked at present with 
technological and industrial networks, could become a structure of control that is 
truly uncontrollable by the citizens. 
In the year 2000 -- what a peculiar year -- Peter Ward and Donald Brownlee 
published a book that was not well received by the “scientific community.”34 These 
authors maintain that the Earth is a very strange planet, life is difficult to explain, and 
the origin of life and the present state of our species is more the result of an 
accumulation of chance events than of the development of a complex system of 
“scientific laws.” Leaving aside the analysis of the facts, which in the case of Ward 
and Brownlee seem very convincing, what we wish to say here is that the debate 
centered strictly on a problem of philosophy of history and of metaphysics: the 
problem of necessity and contingency. These two authors advocated contingency. 
For them, the “standard cosmology,” especially the part referring solely to the Earth, 
would not be the culmination of a series of processes that flow harmoniously into the 
present, but an accumulation of chance events, which in the final analysis would turn 
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out to be unexplainable. This was a direct attack on the “system of science” -- which 
they did not wish to express thus. They were accused of defending religion and 
providence, although they were not doing so. Ever since the validity of narrative 
constructs such as “standard cosmology” and the theory of evolution began to be 
questioned some years ago, the champions of science accuse whoever criticizes 
their constructs -- not the scientific ones but those that are metascientific or narrative 
-- of defending creationism or the Bible, despite the fact that those critics very often 
are not doing so. This is because the defenders of “science” -- which does not 
include all scientists -- are conscious of the fact that they are taking on a role that 
once belonged to religion: the production of absolute truth, the final say. 
Science can be revised, but not religion, they say. This is partly true. Religious 
texts may be interpreted within certain margins, if one accepts only the general 
structure of the dogma. Science can also be revised and interpreted, but also 
requires the acceptance of a basic dogma: its omnipotence and conclusive nature, 
having the final say. Apologists of science, whether scientists or philosophers of 
science with a bad conscience about being philosophers and begging a place under 
the sun within the scientific community, still want to make us believe in the PSR -- 
contingency’s greatest enemy. The problem is that if we want to be coherent, as 
Pruss points out, for us to believe in that principle we must also believe in the 
existence of a thinking being who makes that which is thought and said coincide with 
what is unfortunately contingent and arbitrary.35 That being has been called God, 
whether this be the God of Saint Thomas Aquinas, or the Geist of Hegel’s Science of 
Logic, where the German philosopher -- wanting to know everything -- concluded by 
stating that within the development of his book one could find the same thoughts 
God had before the creation of the world. 
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Someone once asked Saint Augustine what God had thought about before 
creating the world. Saint Augustine answered, “the punishment he would deal out to 
anyone who asked such a question.” We are not going to vindicate Saint Agustin or 
the value of theology (God forbid!), as the defenders of that argument would like to 
believe, but simply restore an interest in contingency, because it is in the best 
interest of our liberty. 
And thus we conclude with an English nursery rhyme that goes something like 
this: 
For want of a nail the shoe was lost. 
For want of a shoe the horse was lost. 
For want of a horse the rider was lost. 
For want of a rider the battle was lost. 
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.  
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail. 
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